Philosophy hasn't managed to offer a type 1 physicalist ontology which explains the evidence.

[someone37]

THESIS

By a "type 1 physicalist ontology", I mean an account of what exists, in which nothing other than the physical
exists and in which physics is thought of as modelling the rules followed by the physical.

This thesis is that philosophy hasn't managed to offer a type 1 physicalist ontology which can explain the
evidence through its model.

DEFENCE OF THESIS

For the purposes of this thesis when I claim that I am consciously experiencing, I mean it is like something to
be me.

In this defence I am going to use the term experiences to mean conscious experiences.

Premise 1: I can tell from my experiences that I am experiencing.

It could be claimed that through the evidence of the objects each of us experiences, which I will refer to as
experiential objects, there is indirect evidence of a physical. I would disagree, though accept there is evidence
of what I shall refer to as environmental objects.

With a type 1 physicalist ontology, there might not be physical objects corresponding to those experienced in a
VR type situation. The environmental objects being modelled on a computer.

While experiencing typing this, I have experienced looking at an object, then looking away from it and then
looking back to it.

While looking away from it, the experiential object I had been looking at, was no longer an experiential object
of mine. The only experiential object I would have of it would be a memory. But when I experienced looking back
at it again, it became an experiential object.

But what do I mean "experienced looking back at it again"?

With the environmental objects idea, there is an environment, often referred to as the universe. And there are
objects in that environment, which I'll refer to as environmental objects. The idea being that while I only ever
experience the experiential human form, and experiential objects, there is an environmental human form
corresponding to the experiential human form that I experience having, and environmental objects. My
understanding is that the experience correlates with the brain activity of the environmental human form that
correlates with the experiential human form I experience having. Give that environmental human a suitable non-
lethal dose of anesthetic then I could cease to have any experience, or remember any experiences for a period of
time.

Had the environmental humans had a more distributed nervous system setup, like that of an octopus for example, it
might have been harder to realise the distinction between experiential objects and environmental objects. As it
is, I experience having a human form, and can experience putting its hands either side of its head while touching
fingertips. And the hands do feel outside of the head. But I can also realise, that like all the objects I
experience, those are experiential objects. And the space I experience is experiential space. But as mentioned
the experience gives the impression that what I experience correlates with the brain activity of the
environmental human form that correlates with the experiential human form I experience having. And that
environmental brain activity is inside a skull where there is no light.

Deduction 1: From Premise 1 ("I can tell from my experiences that I am experiencing") I can deduce that at least
part of reality experiences.

And from Deduction 1 I can deduce:

Deduction 2: That what I experience can influence my deductions.

And by influence I mean make a difference to what the outcome would have been expected to have been without the
influence.

This thesis is that philosophy hasn't managed to offer a type 1 physicalist ontology which explains the evidence
through its model. The evidence being what the experience is like, having a form in an experiential object world,
and that experience being able to influence the deductions made.

The only evidence we have for reality is the experience, and, as far as I am aware: The physics models suggest
that if the entities in their model were used to create an ontology, all that would exist in the ontology would
be the fundamental entities of the model interacting with each other.

If such an ontology didn't have any of the fundamental environmental objects experiencing, then it would be an
ontology in which nothing that exists experiences. And wouldn't fit the evidence.

If the ontology did have at least some of the fundamental environmental objects experiencing, then would I be one
of the fundamental environmental objects? If not, then how does the experience I was having influence the
deductions according to their ontology?

As far as I am aware, no where do the physics models indicate where any experiencing would be expected, or how it
could be tested for. And nor am I aware of any type 1 physicalist ontology that indicates how it would matter to
the environmental human forms what the experience was like, or how the experiential objects have properties which
according to physics the environmental brain state which it correlates with doesn't have.

SOME POTENTIAL REPLIES

Obviously the presentation of a type 1 physicalist ontology which did explain, by the ontology model, how it
mattered to the environmental human forms what the experience was like, such that they were discussing it, and
where the properties of the experience were in the ontology. The light for example. As mentioned the brain
activity could be inside a skull where there is no light. The correlation to brain activity in the environmental
human form wouldn't be enough. That alone wouldn't show where those experiential properties are in their model.
But as I was about to say, the presentation of such an ontology would be devasting for this thesis. As if it
truly did those things (a claim that it does isn't necessarily the same) then the thesis would be wrong.

For example, there could be a type 1 physicalist ontology put forward in which it is claimed that I should think
of experiencing as being a physical process, in the same way that navigating is. That navigating as a function,
influences behaviour, and in the same way, experiencing, as a brain process does. Such a suggestion might
encourage some to reinterpret the question "how does the experience influence behaviour?" to "how does the brain
process that is (by composition) experiencing, influence behaviour?". That would a mistake, and can lead to
missing the point. It isn't enough to claim that the experiential properties correlate to certain brain
processes. There are experiential properties, like light, that don't appear in the physics model when the
processing is done inside a dark skull. And the position that while such properties are lacking in the physics
model, they appear in the philosophical type 1 physicalist ontology model, and those are the type of models the
thesis is about, doesn't help either. The problem with that response is that the property would be one that
appeared in the ontology model and not the physics model, and it is the physics model rules that govern behaviour
(physics modelling the rules the physical follows according to type 1 physicalism). How can what the ontological
property (the experience) is like, influence the behaviour of the environmental form in the ontology? And
obviously experiencing wouldn't be like navigation, as navigation can be explained without bringing into the
account properties which don't appear in the physics model. Thus I am using it to serve as an example of a claim
to offer the type 1 physicalist ontology which the thesis claims hasn't been offered, but actually on closer
examination it being understood to fail to.

Another option could be the rejection of Premise 1 ("I can tell from my experiences that I am experiencing"). And
claim that it is simply an illusion. But that would still leave the issue of where the illusionary properties
would appear in the ontology model, such that the environmental brain activity properties should correlate with
them, unless they were to flat out deny any experiential properties exist. But I would reject that last
suggestion, the denial that experiential properties exist, based on the fact that it not fit the evidence.
Nevertheless there might be some type 1 physicalists that came to the position of feeling that denying the
evidence of the experience was the most defensible option they were aware of, whilst maintaining their position.

END OF THESIS


Wish you all well, and as a wise man might say:
"Follow the loving selfless path".

https://vimeo.com/showcase/the-lottery-issue

[someone37]

(Just repostings as there were some formatting issues)

THESIS

By a "type 1 physicalist ontology", I mean an account of what exists, in which nothing other than the physical
exists and in which physics is thought of as modelling the rules followed by the physical.

This thesis is that philosophy hasn't managed to offer a type 1 physicalist ontology which can explain the
evidence through its model.

DEFENCE OF THESIS

For the purposes of this thesis when I claim that I am consciously experiencing, I mean it is like something to
be me.

In this defence I am going to use the term experiences to mean conscious experiences.

Premise 1: I can tell from my experiences that I am experiencing.

It could be claimed that through the evidence of the objects each of us experiences, which I will refer to as
experiential objects, there is indirect evidence of a physical. I would disagree, though accept there is evidence
of what I shall refer to as environmental objects.

With a type 1 physicalist ontology, there might not be physical objects corresponding to those experienced in a
VR type situation. The environmental objects being modelled on a computer.

While experiencing typing this, I have experienced looking at an object, then looking away from it and then
looking back to it.

While looking away from it, the experiential object I had been looking at, was no longer an experiential object
of mine. The only experiential object I would have of it would be a memory. But when I experienced looking back
at it again, it became an experiential object.

But what do I mean "experienced looking back at it again"?

With the environmental objects idea, there is an environment, often referred to as the universe. And there are
objects in that environment, which I'll refer to as environmental objects. The idea being that while I only ever
experience the experiential human form, and experiential objects, there is an environmental human form
corresponding to the experiential human form that I experience having, and environmental objects. My
understanding is that the experience correlates with the brain activity of the environmental human form that
correlates with the experiential human form I experience having. Give that environmental human a suitable non-
lethal dose of anesthetic then I could cease to have any experience, or remember any experiences for a period of
time.

Had the environmental humans had a more distributed nervous system setup, like that of an octopus for example, it
might have been harder to realise the distinction between experiential objects and environmental objects. As it
is, I experience having a human form, and can experience putting its hands either side of its head while touching
fingertips. And the hands do feel outside of the head. But I can also realise, that like all the objects I
experience, those are experiential objects. And the space I experience is experiential space. But as mentioned
the experience gives the impression that what I experience correlates with the brain activity of the
environmental human form that correlates with the experiential human form I experience having. And that
environmental brain activity is inside a skull where there is no light.

Deduction 1: From Premise 1 ("I can tell from my experiences that I am experiencing") I can deduce that at least
part of reality experiences.

And from Deduction 1 I can deduce:

Deduction 2: That what I experience can influence my deductions.

And by influence I mean make a difference to what the outcome would have been expected to have been without the
influence.

This thesis is that philosophy hasn't managed to offer a type 1 physicalist ontology which explains the evidence
through its model. The evidence being what the experience is like, having a form in an experiential object world,
and that experience being able to influence the deductions made.

The only evidence we have for reality is the experience, and, as far as I am aware: The physics models suggest
that if the entities in their model were used to create an ontology, all that would exist in the ontology would
be the fundamental entities of the model interacting with each other.

If such an ontology didn't have any of the fundamental environmental objects experiencing, then it would be an
ontology in which nothing that exists experiences. And wouldn't fit the evidence.

If the ontology did have at least some of the fundamental environmental objects experiencing, then would I be one
of the fundamental environmental objects? If not, then how does the experience I was having influence the
deductions according to their ontology?

As far as I am aware, no where do the physics models indicate where any experiencing would be expected, or how it
could be tested for. And nor am I aware of any type 1 physicalist ontology that indicates how it would matter to
the environmental human forms what the experience was like, or how the experiential objects have properties which
according to physics the environmental brain state which it correlates with doesn't have.

SOME POTENTIAL REPLIES

Obviously the presentation of a type 1 physicalist ontology which did explain, by the ontology model, how it
mattered to the environmental human forms what the experience was like, such that they were discussing it, and
where the properties of the experience were in the ontology. The light for example. As mentioned the brain
activity could be inside a skull where there is no light. The correlation to brain activity in the environmental
human form wouldn't be enough. That alone wouldn't show where those experiential properties are in their model.

But as I was about to say, the presentation of such an ontology would be devasting for this thesis. As if it
truly did those things (a claim that it does isn't necessarily the same) then the thesis would be wrong.

For example, there could be a type 1 physicalist ontology put forward in which it is claimed that I should think
of experiencing as being a physical process, in the same way that navigating is. That navigating as a function,
influences behaviour, and in the same way, experiencing, as a brain process does. Such a suggestion might
encourage some to reinterpret the question "how does the experience influence behaviour?" to "how does the brain
process that is (by composition) experiencing, influence behaviour?". That would a mistake, and can lead to
missing the point. It isn't enough to claim that the experiential properties correlate to certain brain
processes. There are experiential properties, like light, that don't appear in the physics model when the
processing is done inside a dark skull. And the position that while such properties are lacking in the physics
model, they appear in the philosophical type 1 physicalist ontology model, and those are the type of models the
thesis is about, doesn't help either. The problem with that response is that the property would be one that
appeared in the ontology model and not the physics model, and it is the physics model rules that govern behaviour
(physics modelling the rules the physical follows according to type 1 physicalism). How can what the ontological
property (the experience) is like, influence the behaviour of the environmental form in the ontology? And
obviously experiencing wouldn't be like navigation, as navigation can be explained without bringing into the
account properties which don't appear in the physics model. Thus I am using it to serve as an example of a claim
to offer the type 1 physicalist ontology which the thesis claims hasn't been offered, but actually on closer
examination it being understood to fail to.

Another option could be the rejection of Premise 1 ("I can tell from my experiences that I am experiencing"). And
claim that it is simply an illusion. But that would still leave the issue of
where the illusionary properties would appear in the ontology model, such that the environmental brain activity
properties should correlate with them, unless they were to flat out deny any experiential properties exist. But I
would reject that last suggestion, the denial that experiential properties exist, based on the fact that it not
fit the evidence.

Nevertheless there might be some type 1 physicalists that came to the position of feeling that denying the
evidence of the experience was the most defensible option they were aware of, whilst maintaining their position.

END OF THESIS




Wish you all well, and as a wise man might say:
"Follow the loving selfless path".

https://vimeo.com/showcase/the-lottery-issue

[D]

Post by someone37
(Just repostings as there were some formatting issues)
THESIS
By a "type 1 physicalist ontology", I mean an account of what exists, in which nothing other than the physical
exists and in which physics is thought of as modelling the rules followed by the physical.
This thesis is that philosophy hasn't managed to offer a type 1 physicalist ontology which can explain the
evidence through its model.
DEFENCE OF THESIS
For the purposes of this thesis when I claim that I am consciously experiencing, I mean it is like something to
be me.
In this defence I am going to use the term experiences to mean conscious experiences.
Premise 1: I can tell from my experiences that I am experiencing.
It could be claimed that through the evidence of the objects each of us experiences, which I will refer to as
experiential objects, there is indirect evidence of a physical. I would disagree, though accept there is evidence
of what I shall refer to as environmental objects.
With a type 1 physicalist ontology, there might not be physical objects corresponding to those experienced in a
VR type situation. The environmental objects being modelled on a computer.

Let me introduce you to G.E. Moore
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_is_one_hand). This is a solved
problem, and physicalism is supported by a majority of academic
philosophers ph.d. and above.

You got it backwards. You need to instead show what proof there exists
that the material world does not exist.

That would be revolutionary, and you would surely get some kind of Nobel
prize.

In 2500 years no one has succeeded, and the nr of physicalists is
steadily increasing.

Let idealism and skepticism die an honorable death and come join the
living. ;)

[oldernow]

Post by D
Let idealism and skepticism die an honorable death and
come join the living. ;)

They're vastly overrated. Even the term 'living'
is laughably hyperbolic given they're actually dying.
In fact, a favorite sport of theirs is helping others
die for reasons including the laughably pathetic, e.g.
for "having looked at me wrong", for "having been born
one of 'these' instead of one of 'those'", etc.

Can you recommend a less ridiculously self-centric circus
to join?

[Anton Shepelev]

Post by D
Let me introduce you to G.E. Moore
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_is_one_hand).

Moore's modus ponens argument is of the form:

1. Given : A => B
2. Given : Not B
3. Therefore: Not A

which is a violoation of the basic Boolean logic, because B
may be true and A false. B may follow from correct precept
C; and anything at all may fallow from an incorrect precept.
A need not be correct for B to be true.

Post by D
This is a solved problem, and physicalism is supported by
a majority of academic philosophers ph.d. and above.

IMHO, the best treatment of this problem is Vladimir
Lenin's, /Materialism and Empiriocriticism/:

https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/

[D]

Post by Anton Shepelev

Post by D
Let me introduce you to G.E. Moore
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_is_one_hand).

1. Given : A => B
2. Given : Not B
3. Therefore: Not A
which is a violoation of the basic Boolean logic, because B
may be true and A false. B may follow from correct precept
C; and anything at all may fallow from an incorrect precept.
A need not be correct for B to be true.

Read again carefully. Moore already addresses that.

Post by Anton Shepelev

Post by D
This is a solved problem, and physicalism is supported by
a majority of academic philosophers ph.d. and above.

IMHO, the best treatment of this problem is Vladimir
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/

IMHO I think Moore treats it better. Add to that, the current opinion
among academic philosophers, and I feel pretty certain of my position and
I have not seen anything that even comes close to providing an
alternative.

[Anton Shepelev]

Post by Anton Shepelev
1. Given : A => B
2. Given : Not B
3. Therefore: Not A
which is a violoation of the basic Boolean logic, because
B may be true and A false. B may follow from correct
precept C; and anything at all may fallow from an
incorrect precept. A need not be correct for B to be
true.

_ _
My comment is wrong and irrelevant: A => B == B => A .

The problem is Moore's application of this perfectly correct
identity indirectly, by subsituting "I know that X" for X
and "I don't know that X" for the negation of X. I still
have not read Moore essay, so this is just to let you know
of my error.

[D]

Post by Anton Shepelev

Post by Anton Shepelev
1. Given : A => B
2. Given : Not B
3. Therefore: Not A
which is a violoation of the basic Boolean logic, because
B may be true and A false. B may follow from correct
precept C; and anything at all may fallow from an
incorrect precept. A need not be correct for B to be
true.

_ _
My comment is wrong and irrelevant: A => B == B => A .
The problem is Moore's application of this perfectly correct
identity indirectly, by subsituting "I know that X" for X
and "I don't know that X" for the negation of X. I still
have not read Moore essay, so this is just to let you know
of my error.

Thank you very much for telling me. Would be interested in hearing about
your opinion _if_ you think it's interesting enough to read. I have not
read it but Wittgenstein started (I think) a commentary on this, and he
was a fan of Moores and thought he could improve on him.

[x]

Post by someone37
(Just repostings as there were some formatting issues)
THESIS
By a "type 1 physicalist ontology", I mean an account of what exists, in which nothing other than the physical
exists and in which physics is thought of as modelling the rules followed by the physical.
This thesis is that philosophy hasn't managed to offer a type 1 physicalist ontology which can explain the
evidence through its model.
DEFENCE OF THESIS
For the purposes of this thesis when I claim that I am consciously experiencing, I mean it is like something to
be me.
In this defence I am going to use the term experiences to mean conscious experiences.
Premise 1: I can tell from my experiences that I am experiencing.

Hmmm.

I can tell from cats that there are cats. It doesn't mean that
there has to be a cat there if I say there is one there. All
I have to do is repeat the words 'cat' and it is there. Or
something like that.

Just repeat the word 'experience' with force and it is so.

Just repeat the word 'cat' and shout it several times and
it exists.

You must BELIEVE in the word EXPERIENCE or it is not
actually 'experience'? I am thinking that is 'proof'?
Well, something like that.

Post by someone37
It could be claimed that through the evidence of the objects each of us experiences, which I will refer to as
experiential objects, there is indirect evidence of a physical. I would disagree, though accept there is evidence
of what I shall refer to as environmental objects.
With a type 1 physicalist ontology, there might not be physical objects corresponding to those experienced in a
VR type situation. The environmental objects being modelled on a computer.
While experiencing typing this, I have experienced looking at an object, then looking away from it and then
looking back to it.
While looking away from it, the experiential object I had been looking at, was no longer an experiential object
of mine. The only experiential object I would have of it would be a memory. But when I experienced looking back
at it again, it became an experiential object.
But what do I mean "experienced looking back at it again"?

Yes experience! EXPERIENCE!!!

You must worship the word 'experience' as a god or it does not exist.

If you look back at it again, in your own way you are repeating the
word 'experience' again and again.

Post by someone37
With the environmental objects idea, there is an environment, often referred to as the universe. And there are
objects in that environment, which I'll refer to as environmental objects. The idea being that while I only ever
experience the experiential human form, and experiential objects, there is an environmental human form
corresponding to the experiential human form that I experience having, and environmental objects. My
understanding is that the experience correlates with the brain activity of the environmental human form that
correlates with the experiential human form I experience having. Give that environmental human a suitable non-
lethal dose of anesthetic then I could cease to have any experience, or remember any experiences for a period of
time.
Had the environmental humans had a more distributed nervous system setup, like that of an octopus for example, it
might have been harder to realise the distinction between experiential objects and environmental objects. As it
is, I experience having a human form, and can experience putting its hands either side of its head while touching
fingertips. And the hands do feel outside of the head. But I can also realise, that like all the objects I
experience, those are experiential objects. And the space I experience is experiential space. But as mentioned
the experience gives the impression that what I experience correlates with the brain activity of the
environmental human form that correlates with the experiential human form I experience having. And that
environmental brain activity is inside a skull where there is no light.
Deduction 1: From Premise 1 ("I can tell from my experiences that I am experiencing") I can deduce that at least
part of reality experiences.
Deduction 2: That what I experience can influence my deductions.

Yes you must derive the word 'experience' from 'EXPERIENCE'!!!
This is proof.

Post by someone37
And by influence I mean make a difference to what the outcome would have been expected to have been without the
influence.
This thesis is that philosophy hasn't managed to offer a type 1 physicalist ontology which explains the evidence
through its model. The evidence being what the experience is like, having a form in an experiential object world,
and that experience being able to influence the deductions made.
The only evidence we have for reality is the experience, and, as far as I am aware: The physics models suggest
that if the entities in their model were used to create an ontology, all that would exist in the ontology would
be the fundamental entities of the model interacting with each other.
If such an ontology didn't have any of the fundamental environmental objects experiencing, then it would be an
ontology in which nothing that exists experiences. And wouldn't fit the evidence.
If the ontology did have at least some of the fundamental environmental objects experiencing, then would I be one
of the fundamental environmental objects? If not, then how does the experience I was having influence the
deductions according to their ontology?
As far as I am aware, no where do the physics models indicate where any experiencing would be expected, or how it
could be tested for. And nor am I aware of any type 1 physicalist ontology that indicates how it would matter to
the environmental human forms what the experience was like, or how the experiential objects have properties which
according to physics the environmental brain state which it correlates with doesn't have.
SOME POTENTIAL REPLIES
Obviously the presentation of a type 1 physicalist ontology which did explain, by the ontology model, how it
mattered to the environmental human forms what the experience was like, such that they were discussing it, and
where the properties of the experience were in the ontology. The light for example. As mentioned the brain
activity could be inside a skull where there is no light. The correlation to brain activity in the environmental
human form wouldn't be enough. That alone wouldn't show where those experiential properties are in their model.
But as I was about to say, the presentation of such an ontology would be devasting for this thesis. As if it
truly did those things (a claim that it does isn't necessarily the same) then the thesis would be wrong.
For example, there could be a type 1 physicalist ontology put forward in which it is claimed that I should think
of experiencing as being a physical process, in the same way that navigating is. That navigating as a function,
influences behaviour, and in the same way, experiencing, as a brain process does. Such a suggestion might
encourage some to reinterpret the question "how does the experience influence behaviour?" to "how does the brain
process that is (by composition) experiencing, influence behaviour?". That would a mistake, and can lead to
missing the point. It isn't enough to claim that the experiential properties correlate to certain brain
processes. There are experiential properties, like light, that don't appear in the physics model when the
processing is done inside a dark skull. And the position that while such properties are lacking in the physics
model, they appear in the philosophical type 1 physicalist ontology model, and those are the type of models the
thesis is about, doesn't help either. The problem with that response is that the property would be one that
appeared in the ontology model and not the physics model, and it is the physics model rules that govern behaviour
(physics modelling the rules the physical follows according to type 1 physicalism). How can what the ontological
property (the experience) is like, influence the behaviour of the environmental form in the ontology? And
obviously experiencing wouldn't be like navigation, as navigation can be explained without bringing into the
account properties which don't appear in the physics model. Thus I am using it to serve as an example of a claim
to offer the type 1 physicalist ontology which the thesis claims hasn't been offered, but actually on closer
examination it being understood to fail to.
Another option could be the rejection of Premise 1 ("I can tell from my experiences that I am experiencing"). And
claim that it is simply an illusion. But that would still leave the issue of
where the illusionary properties would appear in the ontology model, such that the environmental brain activity
properties should correlate with them, unless they were to flat out deny any experiential properties exist. But I
would reject that last suggestion, the denial that experiential properties exist, based on the fact that it not
fit the evidence.
Nevertheless there might be some type 1 physicalists that came to the position of feeling that denying the
evidence of the experience was the most defensible option they were aware of, whilst maintaining their position.
END OF THESIS

To me it looks like the thesis is just repeating
and shouting the word 'experience' again and again.

The word 'experience' does not need to have any
real or actual meaning, just repeat it and shout
it and it is so.

Perhaps this is proof.

Post by someone37
"Follow the loving selfless path".
https://vimeo.com/showcase/the-lottery-issue

[oldernow]

Post by x
The word 'experience' does not need to have any
real or actual meaning, just repeat it and shout
it and it is so.

In case anyone out there doubts this, try listening to any
American "liberal Democrat" sometime - a great example of
late being one "Kamala Harris".

(NOTE: be careful how you pronoun her first name lest you
find yourself shamed and shunned from society for high
crimes against someone that isn't an old white male....)

[x]

Post by someone37
THESIS
By a "type 1 physicalist ontology", I mean an account of what exists, in which nothing other than the physical
exists and in which physics is thought of as modelling the rules followed by the physical.
This thesis is that philosophy hasn't managed to offer a type 1 physicalist ontology which can explain the
evidence through its model.
DEFENCE OF THESIS
For the purposes of this thesis when I claim that I am consciously experiencing, I mean it is like something to
be me.
In this defence I am going to use the term experiences to mean conscious experiences.
Premise 1: I can tell from my experiences that I am experiencing.
It could be claimed that through the evidence of the objects each of us experiences, which I will refer to as
experiential objects, there is indirect evidence of a physical. I would disagree, though accept there is evidence
of what I shall refer to as environmental objects.
With a type 1 physicalist ontology, there might not be physical objects corresponding to those experienced in a
VR type situation. The environmental objects being modelled on a computer.
While experiencing typing this, I have experienced looking at an object, then looking away from it and then
looking back to it.
While looking away from it, the experiential object I had been looking at, was no longer an experiential object
of mine. The only experiential object I would have of it would be a memory. But when I experienced looking back
at it again, it became an experiential object.
But what do I mean "experienced looking back at it again"?
With the environmental objects idea, there is an environment, often referred to as the universe. And there are
objects in that environment, which I'll refer to as environmental objects. The idea being that while I only ever
experience the experiential human form, and experiential objects, there is an environmental human form
corresponding to the experiential human form that I experience having, and environmental objects.

Cats are cats. Dogs are dogs. Do any of these two statements describe
what a cat or dog is? But I will go with this, however

Post by someone37
My
understanding is that the experience correlates with the brain activity ...

Yo. Once again, the fundamental reasoning flaw of the belief system,
religion, or pseudoscience called 'psychology'.

Do 'minds' exist? Perhaps?

Do 'brains' exist? Perhaps?

Do 'ideas' exist? Perhaps?

Do 'minds' have 'ideas'? Perhaps?

But are 'minds' necessarily exactly the same thing
as 'brains', or are 'minds' and 'brains' something
different from each other?

Then there is the confusion of ideas, with theories
about how ideas are formed.

The idea is that if you control theories about how
ideas are formed, then you control the content of
the ideas. Once again that is flawed thinking.

Once upon a time many thousands of years ago, people
thought that the heart or liver were seats of the
human mind in the body rather than the brain. In
essence the brain generally 'cooled blood'.

When people thought this, many people now are of
the idea that those ancient views of what the brain
did were wrong.

However, if they had wrong ideas of what the brain
did back then ... .

Were they incapable of having ideas on any subject
whatsoever?

If someone contemplates something on the order of
a theory about anatomy and physiology.

And that theory is wrong.

They will not instantly explode and cease to exist.

So let's stop.

Will you admit that if you were to have a wrong
theory about anatomy or physiology, that you
would not explode and cease to exist?

Post by someone37
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